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Marvin v. Fitch, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 18 (May 27, 2010) 1
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW– Absolute Immunity for Quasi-judicial Functions
Summary
An appeal from a district court order of dismissal, certified as final under NRCP 54(b), in
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
Disposition/Outcome
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s holding which dismissed a § 1983
civil rights claim against the individual members of the State Board of Equalization based upon
their decisions affecting property values, because the State Board’s process of equalizing
property valuations is a quasi-judicial function that affords State Board members absolute
immunity.
Factual and Procedural History
In 2007, the Washoe County Board of Equalization (County Board) reduced the value of
various real properties in Washoe County after it determined that the county assessor had utilized
improper and unconstitutional appraisal methods. Thereafter, a group of residential property
owners (the Taxpayers) alleged the County Board did not adjust or equalize the assessed value of
their properties and petitioned the State Board of Equalization (State Board) for relief.
After a hearing, the State Board determined it lacked jurisdiction because the Taxpayers
failed to petition the County Board, as required under NRS 361.360. The Taxpayers petitioned
for a judicial review of the State Board’s decision and asserted a separate claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging the State Board as a body, and as individuals, violated the Taxpayers civil rights
by failing to perform its statutory duty to equalize property valuations pursuant to NRS 361.395.
After granting judicial review, the district court remanded two issues for further
determination concerning the equalization process. The district court also ordered the State
Board to comply with its duty to equalize property valuations throughout the state. Lastly, the
district court dismissed the § 1983 claim against the individual members of the State Board
under NRCP 12(b)(5) because it was inappropriate to expose individual State Board members to
civil rights claims based on their decisions regarding property valuations. The Taxpayers
appealed.
Discussion
The Nevada Supreme Court confined the issue on appeal to the application of absolute
immunity to the Taxpayer’s § 1983 civil rights claim. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court (1)
examined when absolute immunity is applicable, (2) analyzed whether the State Board’s process
of equalizing property valuations is a quasi-judicial function subject to such immunity, and (3)
addressed the policy considerations supporting its conclusion that the equalization process is
quasi-judicial and the State Board members are afforded absolute immunity.
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Standard of Review
The Nevada Supreme Court rigorously reviews a district court order granting a motion to
dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), and accepts the factual allegations of the pleading as true
while construing those facts in favor of the nonmoving party. 2 Whether absolute immunity is an
appropriate defense for the members of the State Board is a question of law. 3 Questions of law
are reviewed de novo. 4
Judicial Record
The Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that even though the Taxpayers claimed the § 1983
action was based upon the State Board’s refusal to equalize tax valuations, nothing in the record
supported that conclusion. Rather, the record on review showed the State Board engaged in an
equalization decision-making process when it refused to equalize property valuations based upon
the fact that the Taxpayers did not adhere to the established administrative procedures for review
by petitioning the County Board for review as required under NRS 361.360(1). Thus, the State
Board did not simply fail to equalize property valuations as required under NRS 361.395, even
though the district court found the State Board’s decision was incorrect, and whether State Board
members and the equalization process are afforded absolute immunity still needed to be decided.
Absolute Immunity
After defining both “immunity” and “absolute immunity” under Nevada precedent, 5 the
Nevada Supreme Court explained that the United States Supreme Court extended absolute
immunity to include non-judicial officers who participate in the judicial process, 6 and that other
courts have applied absolute immunity to individuals who perform quasi-judicial functions. 7
Quasi-judicial Functions
The Nevada Supreme Court explained how the “functional approach” adopted by the
United States Supreme Court analyzes the nature of the function an individual performs, rather
than the individual’s identity, to determine whether absolute immunity applies to that individual
by considering various factors, including: (1) whether the individual is performing many of the
same functions as a judicial officer, (2) whether the process or proceeding is adversarial, (3)
whether procedural safeguards are in place similar to a traditional court, (4) the ability to correct
errors on appeal, and (5) whether any protective measures ensure the constitutionality of the
individual’s conduct and guard against political influences. 8
After explaining the State Board’s functions and establishing that NRS Chapter 361 lacks
clarity as to the processes and procedures the State Board undertakes regarding when and how to
2

Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, 125 Nev. ___, ___, 221 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2009).
Duff v. Lewis, 114 Nev. 564, 568, 958 P.2d 82, 85 (1998).
4
Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno, 125 Nev. ___, ___, 218 P.3d 847, 850 (2009).
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See State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 118 Nev. 609, 614-15, 55 P.3d 420, 423-24 (quoting James L. Knoll,
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122 (1998)).
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Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (“[T]he role of an administrative hearing examiner is “‘functionally
comparable’ to that of a judge.”).
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See Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999); State v. Second Judicial District, 118 Nev. at 617, 55 P.3d
at 425; Duff, 114 Nev. at 571, 958 P.2d at 87.
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Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269
(1993) (internal quotation omitted)); State v. Second Judicial District, 118 Nev. at 616, 55 P.3d at 424-25.
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equalize property valuations, the Nevada Supreme analyzed the equalization process under the
United States Supreme Court’s “functional approach” as follows:
First, members of the State Board function like judicial officers under the equalization
process by receiving evidence, rendering decisions, issuing subpoenas, and regulating hearings. 9
Second, the State Board’s equalization process is adversarial in nature because its
meetings are open to the public, individuals may be represented by counsel, and individuals may
contest the assessed value of their own property or present evidence questioning the value of the
property of others—quintessential indications of the adversarial nature of the equalization
process. 10
Third, the equalization process applies procedural safeguards under NRS 361’s notice
requirements. Similar to a court, these requirements safeguard individual due process rights by:
(1) requiring public notice of the State Board’s annual meeting through various postings, (2)
giving specific notice to the interested property owner when the State Board proposes to increase
a property valuation and giving the owner an opportunity to appear and submit evidence, and (3)
giving owners another notice when a property’s valuation does increase. 11
Fourth, errors can be corrected on appeal because the Legislature provided taxpayers with
the opportunity to either seek judicial review of State Board determinations, or file a lawsuit for
discriminatory property value assessments. 12
Fifth, NRS 361 structures the State Board’s membership strictly enough to shield it from
political influence collectively and allow the individual members to function as neutral
adjudicators. The required statutory structure contains detailed requirements regarding the
specific skill sets individual board members must have, restrictions regarding political
affiliations and political appointments, and residency requirements.
Policy Considerations
The Nevada Supreme Court cited, in part, to Butz, 13 stating its conclusion that the State
Board members are entitled to absolute immunity is also supported by two policy considerations.
First, affording State Board members absolute immunity facilitates the equalization process by
allowing the members to initiate proceedings without a distorting fear of liability, which in turn,
prevents the state’s ability to recruit and retain qualified members from being hindered. Second,
concluding that the State Board’s equalization process is quasi-judicial honors the Legislature’s
intent that the equalization process under NRS 361 should be conducted as an adversarial process
that gives Nevada’s taxpayers a right to meaningful participation, rather than as an administrative
process that would not give the same assurance.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded the State Board
and its individual members were entitled to absolute immunity because they performed a quasijudicial function when deciding to equalize property.
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See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 361.395, 361.385 (2007), NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 361.712, 361.381 (2007).
NEV. REV. STAT. §361.385 (2007); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.355.
11
NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.380; see also NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 361.686 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 241.020,
361.395, 361.405 (2007).
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NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 361.420, 361.420 (2007).
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See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-16 (1978).
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BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.[1]

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:
In this appeal, we consider the application of absolute immunity to individual members of
the State Board of Equalization (State Board). Absolute immunity is a broad immunity that is
granted sparingly to individuals performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. State of Nevada
v. Dist. Ct. (Ducharm), 118 Nev. 609, 615-16, 55 P.3d 420, 423-24 (2002). On appeal,
appellants Charles Marvin, Gary Taylor, and 400 Tuscarora Road, LLC (collectively, the
Taxpayers), argue that the members of the State Board do not qualify for absolute immunity
because the State Board refused to perform its duty of equalizing property valuations throughout
the state pursuant to NRS 361.395.[2] We disagree and conclude that the State Board is
performing a quasi-judicial function when determining whether to equalize property valuations,
and its members therefore have absolute immunity.
FACTS
The Taxpayers own residential property located in the Incline Village and Crystal Bay
areas of Washoe County, Nevada. In 2007, the Washoe County Board of Equalization (County
Board) determined that the county assessor had utilized improper and unconstitutional methods
of appraising real property and, consequently, the County Board reduced the value of various
properties in Washoe County. Allegedly, the County Board did not adjust or equalize the
assessed value of the Taxpayers’ properties.
In March 2007, the Taxpayers petitioned the State Board for relief from the County
Board’s failure to equalize the assessed value of their properties. The State Board conducted a
hearing on the matter and determined that it lacked jurisdiction because the Taxpayers had failed
to first petition the County Board, as required by NRS 361.360.[3] The Taxpayers subsequently
filed a petition for judicial review of the State Board’s decision and, within the same pleading,
asserted a separate claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that their civil rights had been
violated by the State Board’s failure to perform its statutory duty to equalize property valuations
pursuant to NRS 361.395. The § 1983 claim was also brought against Clay Fitch, Stephen
Johnson, Richard Mason, and Michael Cheshire, individual members of the State Board.
The district court granted the petition for judicial review and (1) remanded the matter to
the State Board and/or the County Board to determine whether the Taxpayers had complied with
the provisions of NRS 361.420, (2) remanded the matter to the State Board to establish a record
as to whether the Department of Taxation had complied with the requirement to ensure
equalization throughout the state, and (3) ordered the State Board to comply with its duty to
equalize property valuations throughout the state.

The individual members of the State Board moved to dismiss the § 1983 claim against
them under NRCP 12(b)(5), arguing that they are entitled to absolute immunity. The district
court granted the motion and dismissed the § 1983 claim against the individual members
reasoning that “expos[ing] individual State Board [m]embers to civil rights claims based on their
decision to raise values, lower values, or take no action when determining the equalization of
values is inappropriate.”[4] The Taxpayers appeal this decision.
DISCUSSION
For clarity, we recognize that although the Taxpayers filed both a petition for judicial
review and a § 1983 civil rights claim in the court below, this appeal is confined to the
application of absolute immunity to the Taxpayer’s § 1983 civil rights claim alleging that
individual State Board members are liable because they refused to equalize property valuations
pursuant to NRS 361.395. The Taxpayers contend that their § 1983 claim rests on the State
Board’s refusal to undertake its statutory duty to equalize property valuations under NRS
361.395. However, the record before the district court and this court shows that the State Board
refused to equalize property valuations because the Taxpayers failed to adhere to the
administrative procedures for review. Although the State Board’s decision to not equalize the
Taxpayers’ property valuations based on administrative procedures may have been erroneous
according to the district court, the State Board engaged in an equalization decision-making
process and did not simply fail to equalize as the Taxpayers contend. In resolving this appeal,
we must first examine when absolute immunity is applicable and then analyze whether the State
Board’s process of equalizing property valuations is a quasi-judicial function subject to such
immunity. Finally, we address the policy considerations supporting our conclusion that the
equalization process is quasi-judicial and the State Board members are afforded absolute
immunity.
Standard of review
This court rigorously reviews a district court order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant
to NRCP 12(b)(5). Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, 125 Nev. ___, ___, 221 P.3d 1276, 1280
(2009). And we will accept the factual allegations of the pleading as true while construing those
facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Whether absolute immunity is an appropriate defense
for the members of the State Board is a question of law. Duff v. Lewis, 114 Nev. 564, 568, 958
P.2d 82, 85 (1998). We review questions of law de novo. Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of
Reno, 125 Nev. ___, ___, 218 P.3d 847, 850 (2009).
Judicial record
The record before the district court and this court indicates that the Taxpayers brought an
appeal before the State Board complaining that the County Board failed to perform its duty of
equalizing property valuations. However, the State Board declined to undertake any equalization
process because the Taxpayers had neglected to file a petition for review with the County Board
and, therefore, failed to adhere to the administrative procedures for equalization relief. As such,
the State Board determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Taxpayers’ appeal or to proceed
with the equalization process. While the Taxpayers claim the § 1983 action is based upon the

State Board’s refusal to equalize, nothing in the record supports that conclusion. See Carson
Ready Mix v. First Nat’l Bk., 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981) (concluding that
appellant bears the burden to make an adequate appellate record and noting that this court may
not consider matters outside of the district court record on appeal); Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll.
Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (stating that “appellants are
responsible for making an adequate appellate record” and “[w]hen an appellant fails to include
necessary documentation in the record, we necessarily presume that the missing portion supports
the district court’s decision”).
In its written decision, the State Board stated that it “found no record that the Taxpayer[s]
requested the County Board for equalization relief or that the County Board took action to grant
or deny equalization relief to the subject property as required by NRS 361.360(1).” Accordingly,
the State Board concluded that, “[b]ased on the lack of a record made to or by the County Board
with regard to request for relief, or that the County Board took action to grant or deny relief, the
State Board did not accept jurisdiction to determine this matter.” Even though the district court
found that the State Board’s decision to not equalize the Taxpayers’ property valuations was
incorrect, it was nevertheless a decision regarding the equalization process. Therefore, we must
determine whether that decision and the equalization process in general are afforded absolute
immunity.
Absolute immunity
On appeal, the Taxpayers challenge whether the individual members of the State Board
are entitled to absolute immunity. Immunity “‘is a matter of public policy that balances the
social utility of the immunity against the social loss of being unable to attack the immune
defendant.’” Ducharm, 118 Nev. at 614-15, 55 P.3d at 423 (quoting James L. Knoll, Protecting
Participants in the Mediation Process: The Role of Privilege and Immunity, 34 Tort & Ins. L.J.
115, 122 (1998)). Absolute immunity protects judicial officers from collateral attack and
recognizes that appellate procedures are the appropriate method of correcting judicial error. Id.
at 615, 55 P.3d at 424.
Generally, qualified immunity,[5] rather than absolute immunity, is sufficient to protect
nonjudicial officers in the performance of their duties, id. at 617, 55 P.3d at 425 (quoting Burns
v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991)); however, in Butz v. Economou, the United States
Supreme Court extended the application of absolute immunity to include various nonjudicial
officers who participate in the judicial process. 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (determining that the
role of an administrative hearing examiner is “‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge”).
Following Butz, courts have applied absolute immunity to individuals who perform quasijudicial functions. Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
individual members of the Nevada Board of Medical Examiners are entitled to absolute
immunity for their quasi-judicial acts); Ducharm, 118 Nev. at 617, 55 P.3d at 425; Duff, 114
Nev. at 571, 958 P.2d at 87 (holding that a court-appointed psychologist was entitled to absolute
immunity because he was acting as an extension of the court).
To determine whether an individual is entitled to absolute immunity, the Supreme Court
has adopted a “functional approach,” which “‘looks to the nature of the function performed, not

the identity of the [individual] who performed it.’” Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d, 1182, 1186 (9th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (internal quotation
omitted)). The “functional approach” takes into consideration various factors including: whether
the individual is performing many of the same functions as a judicial officer, whether there are
procedural safeguards in place similar to a traditional court, whether the process or proceeding is
adversarial, the ability to correct errors on appeal, and whether there are any protective measures
to ensure the constitutionality of the individual’s conduct and to guard against political
influences. Id. at 1186-87; see also Ducharm, 118 Nev. at 616, 55 P.3d at 424-25.
Applying the “functional approach” to this case, and following our further analysis
below, we determine that the State Board and its individual members perform a quasi-judicial
function when deciding to equalize property valuations. Accordingly, we conclude that the
individual members are entitled to absolute immunity in their performance of this quasi-judicial
act.
The State Board’s duty to equalize property valuations is a quasi-judicial function
The Nevada Constitution mandates that “[t]he [L]egislature shall provide by law for a
uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real, personal and possessory.” Nev. Const.
art. 10, § 1(1). The State Board is governed by NRS Chapter 361, which obligates the State
Board to equalize property valuations throughout the state:
[T]he [State Board] shall:
(a) Equalize property valuations in the State.
(b) Review the tax rolls of the various counties as corrected by the county boards of
equalization thereof and raise or lower, equalizing and establishing the taxable value of the
property.
NRS 361.395(1).
We previously determined that, under the statutes, the State Board has two
separate functions: “equalizing property valuations throughout the state and hearing appeals from
the county boards.” State, Bd. of Equalization v. Barta, 124 Nev. 612, 628, 188 P.3d 1092, 1102
(2008). The State Board’s predominant concern, however, should be the guarantee of a uniform
and equal rate of taxation. Id.
Although the statutes clearly provide that the State Board has a duty to equalize property
valuations throughout the state, there appears to be a lack of certainty in the procedures for the
equalization process that has resulted in an ambiguity as to whether the process is an
administrative or a quasi-judicial function. NRS 361.395(1) obligates the State Board to
equalize property valuations, and NRS 361.395(2) and 361.405(1) require notice be given to
property owners when equalization results in a proposed or actual increase to a property’s
valuation. However, NRS Chapter 361 lacks clarity as to the processes and procedures that the
State Board undertakes in determining to equalize property valuations, equalization methods, and
the relevant sequence of events. When the Legislature has addressed a particular matter with

imperfect clarity, this court will consider the statutory scheme as a whole and any underlying
policy in order to interpret the law. See In re Orpheus Trust, 124 Nev. 170, 174-75, 179 P.3d
562, 565 (2008).
The Taxpayers argue that the duty to equalize property valuations is an administrative
function that does not incorporate the traditional attributes of a judicial proceeding and,
therefore, absolute immunity should not apply. We disagree and conclude that the State Board’s
equalization process is a quasi-judicial function. Considering the factors in the “functional
approach,” the members of the State Board perform quasi-judicial functions because the
equalization process requires the members to perform functions (fact-finding and making legal
conclusions) similar to judicial officers, the process is adversarial, it applies procedural
safeguards similar to a court, errors can be corrected on appeal, and the statutory scheme retains
State Board members’ independence from political influences.
State Board members perform functions similar to judicial officers
Judicial officers exercise independent judgment to “issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of
evidence, regulate the course of . . . hearing[s], and make or recommend decisions.” Butz, 438
U.S. at 513. The State Board is presented with evidence of property valuations from the county
tax rolls or from interested property owners, and is required to make findings and issue decisions
regarding the necessity and method of equalization. See NRS 361.395(1); NRS 361.385(1).
Evaluating the necessity of equalization, State Board members have the ability to issue
subpoenas and require witness testimony, NAC 361.712, as well as the authority to regulate the
course of hearings and “hold such number of [hearings] as may be necessary to care for the
business of equalization presented to it.” NRS 361.380(1). Because State Board members
receive evidence, render decisions, and regulate hearings, we conclude that members of the State
Board function like judicial officers.
The equalization process is adversarial
Proceedings that are quasi-judicial “are usually adversarial in nature and provide many of
the same features and safeguards that are provided in court.” Romano, 169 F.3d at 1186. The
State Board’s annual meetings are open to the public and permit individuals to participate in
person or be represented by an attorney. NRS 361.385(1). At the meetings, an individual may
challenge a property’s valuation recorded on the county tax rolls and submit evidence for the
State Board’s consideration “with respect to the valuation of his or her property or the property
of others.” Id.; see NRS 361.355. We conclude that the ability to contest the assessed value of
one’s own property or present evidence questioning the value of the property of others is a
quintessential indication of the adversarial nature of the equalization process. Thus, we deem the
State Board’s equalization process to be adversarial in nature and “functionally comparable” to
an adjudicatory proceeding. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513.
Procedural safeguards applied to the equalization process
Notice is a fundamental requisite of due process that is employed as a procedural
safeguard in any judicial action. See Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 217, 954 P.2d 741, 743

(1998). Nevada’s statutory scheme regulating the equalization process safeguards a person’s due
process rights by requiring that public notice be given for the State Board’s annual meeting, at
which the State Board considers increases to property valuations. NRS 361.380(2). The public
notice requirement is accomplished through “publication in the statutes of the . . . time, place and
purpose of [the annual meeting],” see id., by posting notices at the Department of Taxation
offices in Carson City, Reno, Las Vegas, and Elko, see NAC 361.686(1); and in accordance with
statutory public meeting notice requirements, see NRS 241.020. In the event that the State Board
proposes to increase the valuation of any property, the State Board is required to give specific
notice to the interested property owner detailing when and where the property owner may appear
and submit evidence of the property’s value. NRS 361.395(2). If the State Board does increase
the property’s valuation, the property owner is entitled to another notice of the increased value.
NRS 361.405(1). We conclude that NRS Chapter 361’s notice requirements are sufficient
procedural safeguards to ensure that the public is afforded due process throughout the State
Board’s equalization process.
Ability to correct errors on appeal
Additionally, the “correctability of error on appeal” is another procedural “safeguard[ ]
built into the judicial process [that] tend[s] to reduce the need for private damages actions.”
Butz, 438 U.S. at 512. Recognizing that the State Board’s equalization process is adversarial, the
Legislature provided that a taxpayer may seek judicial review of a State Board’s determination or
bring a lawsuit “in any court of competent jurisdiction in the State.” NRS 361.420(2). “No
taxpayer may be deprived of any remedy or redress in a court of law” for wrongs or deprivations
resulting from the findings of the State Board. NRS 361.410(1). In such a case, a taxpayer may
bring a lawsuit claiming that the property value assessment is “discriminatory in that it is not in
accordance with a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, but is at a higher rate of the
taxable value of the property so assessed than that at which the other property in the State is
assessed.” NRS 361.420(4)(g). We determine that a taxpayer’s ability to appeal the State
Board’s decisions and findings provides the appropriate remedy to correct errors and is
indicative of a quasi-judicial proceeding.
Protective measures to guard against political influences
Furthermore, a judge or quasi-judicial adjudicator should not allow political influences to
affect his or her judicial conduct or judgment. NCJC Canon 2, Rule 2.4. The Legislature has
attempted to protect the State Board members from the influence of political forces by creating
strict membership qualifications. The State Board members are appointed by the governor and
serve four-year terms. NRS 361.375(1) and (5). The State Board’s membership must consist of
one certified public accountant, one property appraiser, one member “versed in the valuation of
centrally assessed properties,” and two members “versed in business generally.” NRS
361.375(2). Membership is further limited to no more than three members affiliated with the
same political party, and no more than two members residing in the same county. NRS
361.375(3). No elected official or employee of an elected official may be appointed to serve,
and no member can serve more than two full consecutive terms. NRS 361.375(4)-(5). We
determine that the structure of the State Board’s membership adequately shields its collective
membership from political influence and allows them to function as neutral adjudicators.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State Board performs a quasi-judicial
function when deciding to equalize property valuations and, as such, its individual members are
afforded absolute immunity from lawsuits based on their performance of this quasi-judicial act.
See Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles, 223 P.3d 57, 63 (Cal. 2010) (recognizing that the board
of equalization exercises quasi-judicial powers); County of Adams v. Bd. of Equal., 566 N.W.2d
392, 397 (Neb. 1997) (stating that the actions of equalizing property values between counties is
quasi-judicial in nature); Fayetteville Independent Sch. Dist. v. Crowley, 528 S.W.2d 344, 347
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (affirming that “a board of equalization is a quasi-judicial body, charged
with . . . equalization . . . of assessments”).
Policy considerations
In addition to the application of the “functional approach,” our conclusion that the State
Board members are entitled to absolute immunity is also supported by policy considerations,
specifically, it facilitates the process and abides by legislative intent. “The discretion
which . . . officials exercise with respect to the initiation of . . . proceedings might be distorted if
their immunity from damages arising from that decision was less than complete.” Butz, 438 U.S.
at 515. The State Board members should be permitted to “make the decisions to move forward
with a[ ] . . . proceeding free from intimidation or harassment.” Id. at 516. The prospect of
individual State Board members being subjected to litigation from every disgruntled property
owner is likely to result in having State Board members who are reluctant or unable to perform
their duties and will hinder the state’s ability to recruit and retain qualified members.
Additionally, NRS Chapter 361 clearly demonstrates the Legislature’s intent that the
equalization process be open to the public and that the individual taxpayer be given notice of and
the opportunity to participate in the State Board’s valuation of his or her property. To conclude
that the State Board’s equalization process is a purely administrative function rather than a quasijudicial function may preclude a taxpayer’s ability to participate in this process.[6] If the
equalization process was determined to be administrative, Nevada’s taxpayers in general would
not be assured of their adversarial right to participate in the meetings, present evidence, provide
testimony, or seek judicial review. By concluding that the State Board’s equalization process is
quasi-judicial, we honor the Legislature’s intent and safeguard every taxpayer’s right to
meaningfully participate in the annual equalization process.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing the Taxpayers’ § 1983 civil
rights claim.

PARRAGUIRRE, C.J., and DOUGLAS, CHERRY, SAITTA, and GIBBONS, JJ., concur.

**********FOOTNOTES**********

[1]
The Honorable Kristina Pickering, Justice, did not participate in the decision of this
matter.
[2]
This appeal is limited to the liability of the individual members of the State Board
pursuant to the district court’s certification of the judgment pertaining to the individual members
under NRCP 54(b).
[3]
On appeal, the members of the State Board made a motion to supplement the appellate
record with a transcript of the hearing before the State Board wherein the State Board determined
that it lacked jurisdiction. The Taxpayers filed an opposition to the State Board member’s
motion, as well as their own motion that this court take judicial notice that the matter of
statewide equalization did not appear on any State Board agenda for the relevant term. We
denied the requested relief and do not consider the supplemental material from either party
because neither the transcript nor the subject of the request for judicial notice were presented to
or considered by the district court.
[4]
We recognize that the district court may have commingled the petition for judicial
review and the § 1983 civil rights claim when it reasoned that the State Board’s determination
that it did not have jurisdiction over the Taxpayers’ petition was a quasi-judicial function.
Regardless, we affirm the district court’s outcome that absolute immunity is applicable. See
Rosenstein v. Steele, 103 Nev. 571, 575, 747 P.2d 230, 233 (1987) (noting that this court will
affirm a district court’s order if the district court reached the correct result, even if for the wrong
reason).
[5]
Qualified immunity and absolute immunity are distinguishable. Ducharm, 118 Nev. at
615 n.9, 55 P.3d at 423 n.9. “[A]bsolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset of litigation as long
as the official’s actions were within the scope of the immunity.” Id. Qualified immunity may
also provide immunity from suit so long as the defendant’s actions were not in violation of
clearly established law. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-27 (1985).
[6]
We do not address in this opinion whether Nevada’s Administrative Procedure Act,
codified in NRS Chapter 233B, permits judicial review of purely administrative functions.

